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Abstract
We investigate the Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel (AVWC) with non-causal side information at the jammer for the
case that there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper and under the condition that strong degradedness holds. Non-causal side
information means that codewords are known at an active adversary before they are transmitted. By considering the maximum
error criterion, we allow also messages to be known at the jammer before the corresponding codeword is transmitted. A single
letter formula for the common randomness secrecy capacity is derived.
Index Terms
Active Eavesdroppers, AVWC, Channel Inputs known to the Jammer, Physical Layer Secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secrecy in an adversarial environment is an essential criterion in modern communication systems. It was Wyner, [1],
who considered secure communications over noisy channels and introduced the Wiretap Channel (WTC). Later, his work
was extended by [2] to the Broadcast channel with confidential messages. Since wireless communications is vulnerable to
eavesdropping due its broadcasting nature, the motivation of the previous two works to combat a passive eavesdropper by
cleverly taking the physical properties of the transmit medium into account and to come up with a coding strategy which can
guarantee information theoretic security and reliable communication at the same time is apparent. But those works had in
common that the adversary was assumed to be passive.
By introducing channel states, active adversaries who can arbitrarily modify the channel state can be modeled by the
Arbitrarily Varying Channel (AVC). For the AVC, different code concepts have been introduced in [3] and extensively discussed
in [4] for different error criteria. It could be shown that the random code capacity of an AVC under the average error criterion
equals its random code capacity under the maximum error criterion. Even though [4] provided a condition for the deterministic
code capacity under the maximum error criterion to be positive, the question about the exact formula is open until today.
In [5], [6], the authors investigate non-causal side information at a jammer for an AVC, and an arbitrarily varying quantum
channel,respectively. The authors prove that the random code capacities for average and maximum error in both scenarios that
the jammer only knows the channel input or the jammer knows both the channel input and the corresponding message are
equal. In [7], Sarwate generalized the situation of ”nosy noise”, [5], where the channel input is perfectly known at the jammer,
to an ”myopic adversaries”, where a jammer has a noise version of the channel input as side information. He used a relation
between deterministic list codes under the maximum error criterion and random codes.
If secrecy requirements are combined with active attacks on communication systems, the Arbitrarily VaryingWiretap Channel
is the correct channel model. In [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], the AVWC was studied subject to the average error criterion under
various constraints. The authors of [13] derive a general multi-letter formula for the common randomness assisted code secrecy
capacity and a single-letter formula for the strongly degraded case under the average error criterion.
In this work, we consider the AVWC with non-causal side information at the jammer and provide the random code secrecy
capacity under the maximum error criterion for the case that there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper and under the
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2Common Randomness Un
Wn(yn|xn, sn)
V n(zn|xn, sn)
EncoderM Decoder
Decoder
Mˆ
Mˆ ′
Alice Bob
Eve
u u
u
snJimmy
Xnu
Xnu
Y nsn
Znsn
Fig. 1: System model. Jammer has non-causal knowledge about the channel input.
condition that the eavesdropping channel is strongly degraded with respect to the main channel. Non-causal side information
means that codewords are known at an active adversary before they are transmitted. By considering the maximum error criterion,
we allow the active attacker to know the messages, as well. For the considered case, we are able to provide a single letter
formula for the secrecy capacity. We use methods of [6], hence random coding arguments instead of list codes, [5].
By considering this model, we are able to describe situations, in which a communication system is subject to two different
attacks, eavesdropping and jamming attacks. For both, we individually assume worst case scenarios. The eavesdropper obtains
a perfect observation of the common randomness shared between the legitimate communication partners. Hence the common
randomness cannot be used as a key to encrypt the data. Here, we explicitly exclude cooperation between the active and the
passive attacker, since cooperation trivially renders the secrecy capacity zero.
Notation: We use the notation of [13]. In particular, all logarithms are taken to the base 2. Equivalently, the exp {.}
function means 2{.}. Sets are denoted by calligraphic letters. The cardinality of a set U is denoted by |U|. The set of all
probability measures on a set U is denoted by P(U). For p ∈ P(U) we define pn ∈ P(Un) as pn(xn) =
∏
i p(xi). The
entropies, and mutual information terms will be written in terms of the involved probability functions. For example
H(W |p) := −
∑
x,y
p(x)W (y|x) logW (y|x)
I(p;W ) := H(pW )−H(W |p).
Furthermore, let the type of a sequence sn = (s1, s2, ..., sn) be the probability measure q ∈ P(S) defined by q(a) =
1
nN(a|s
n),
where N(a|sn) denotes the number of occurrences of a in the sequence sn. The set of all possible types of sequences of
length n is denoted by Pn0 (S). Additionally, for a p ∈ P(X ) and δ > 0, we define the typical set T
n
p,δ ⊂ X
n as the set of
sequences xn ∈ Xn satisfying for all a ∈ X the conditions∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a|xn)− p(a)
∣∣∣∣ < δ, and N(a|xn) = 0 if p(a) = 0.
Similarly, for a W ∈ P(Y|X ) and a δ > 0 we define the conditionally typical set T nW,δ(x
n) ⊂ Yn as the set of sequences
yn ∈ Yn satisfying for all a ∈ Xn, b ∈ Yn the conditions
∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a, b|xn, yn)−W (b|a) 1nN(a|xn)
∣∣∣∣ < δ,
N(a, b|xn, yn) = 0 if W (b|a) = 0.
See also [14] for the method of types and the definitions of typicality. The paper is organized as follows. We present the
system model in Section II and state our main result in Section III. Finally, we provide an example in Section IV and close
with a discussion, Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a common randomness assisted AVWC as depicted in Fig. (1). In contrast to previous work, here an external
jammer has non-causal access to the channel input Xnu . Note that this system model has been considered without secrecy
constraints by Sarwate [5], using a connection between deterministic list codes and random codes. Furthermore, this system
3model also has been considered without secrecy constraints for the classical-quantum case by Boche et al. [6]. In the latter
case, the authors used random coding arguments instead of list codes, as done in [5].
Remark 1. We explicitly exclude the possibility of a cooperating jammer and eavesdropper. Otherwise, the jammer would be
able to encode channel inputs xn into state sequences sn such that the eavesdropper gets a version of the xn, such that the
leakage does not vanish asymptotically, rendering the common randomness secrecy capacity zero.
Definition 1. We describe an Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel by (X ,S,W ,V ,Y,Z). The family of channels to the
legitimate receiver is described by W = {(Ws : X → Y) : s ∈ S}. The family of channels to the illegitimate receiver is
described by V = {(Vs : X → Z) : s ∈ S}. The channel is memoryless in the sense that the probability of receiving the
sequences yn = (y1, y2, ..., yn) and z
n = (z1, z2, ..., zn), when sending x
n = (x1, x2, ..., xn) is
Wn(yn|xn, sn) =
n∏
i=1
W (yi|xi, si),
V n(zn|xn, sn) =
n∏
i=1
V (zi|xi, si).
By (W ,V), we mean the AVWC defined above.
Definition 2. An (n, Jn,Un, pU ) common randomness assisted wiretap code K
ran
n consists of a family of stochastic encoders
Eu : J → X
n and mutually disjoint decoding sets Dj,u : Y
n → J with message set J := {1, ..., Jn}, where u ∈ Un has
a distribution pU ∈ P(U). The maximum error probability averaged over all possible randomly chosen deterministic wiretap
codebooks e(Krann ) can be written as
e(Krann ) := max
sn∈Sn
max
j∈Jn
∑
u∈Un
pU (u)
∑
xn∈Xn
Eu(x
n|j)Wn(Dcj,u|x
n, sn).
We define the channel pXn,U|J : J → X
n × U as
pXn,U|J(x
n, u|j) = Eu(x
n|j)pU (u).
Let F : Xn → Sn describe the family of all possible mappings from Xn to Sn. If the jammer has non-causal knowledge
about the channel input xn, then the maximum error probability has to be adapted to
eˆ(Krann ) := max
j∈Jn
∑
xn∈Xn
pXn|J (x
n|j) max
sn=f(xn)
f∈F
∑
u∈Un
pU|Xn,J (u|x
n, j)Wn(Dcj,u|x
n, sn).
Remark 2. In contrast to the standard AVWC, here in the case of non-causal knowledge at the jammer the maximization of
sn is done within each term of the sum. Further, this maximum error criterion corresponds to the case where the jammer
additionally knows the message.
Definition 3. A nonnegative number RS is called an achievable common randomness assisted secrecy rate for the AVWC if
there exists a sequence (Krann )
∞
n=1 of (n, Jn,Un, pU ) common randomness assisted codes, such that the following requirements
are fulfilled
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ RS , (1)
lim
n→∞
e(Krann ) = 0, (2)
lim
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
max
u∈Un
I(pJ ;EuV
n
sn) = 0. (3)
A nonnegative number R̂S is called an achievable common randomness assisted secrecy rate for the AVWC with non-causal
knowledge of the channel input at the jammer if there exists a sequence (Krann )
∞
n=1 of (n, Jn,Un, pU ) common randomness
assisted codes, such that the following requirements are fulfilled
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ R̂S , (4)
lim
n→∞
eˆ(Krann ) = 0, (5)
lim
n→∞
max
f∈F
max
u∈Un
I(pJ ;EuV
n
f ) = 0, (6)
where V nf = V
n(zn|xn, f(xn)). The supremum of all achievable common randomness assisted secrecy rates for the AVWC
is called the common randomness assisted secrecy capacity of the AVWC (W ,V) and is denoted by CranS (W ,V), when the
jammer has no knowledge about the channel input, and ĈranS (W ,V) with non-causal knowledge of the channel input at the
jammer.
4The secrecy capacity CranS is lower bounded by Ĉ
ran
S . Note that the eavesdropper has access to the common randomness.
Hence, the randomness cannot be used as a key to ensure secure communication between Alice and Bob. We explicitly do not
bound the cardinality of the common randomness. For a discussion about the capacities without secrecy requirements, see [6].
Remark 3. Note that we can indeed consider the maximization over θn ∈ P(Sn|Xn) instead of considering the maximization
over all deterministic mappings F : Xn → Sn. For the proof see Appendix C.
Definition 4 (Convex closure and row convex closure [4]). Let p ∈ P(S) and pˆ ∈ P(S|X ) be probability measures. The
convex closure and the row convex closure of the AVC are defined as
Ŵ :=
{
Wp(Y |X) :
∑
s∈S
p(s)W (Y |X, s), p ∈ P(S)
}
(7)
Ŵ :=
{
Wpˆ(Y |X) :
∑
s∈S
pˆ(s|x)W (·|x, s), pˆ(s|x) ∈ P(S|X ), x ∈ X ,
}
(8)
Example 1. Let X = Y = S = {0, 1}, and
W (Y |X,S = 0) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, W (Y |X,S = 1) =
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
The convex closure and the row convex closure are given respectively as
Ŵ =
{
W (Y |X) :
(
α 1− α
1− α α
)
, α ∈ [0, 1]
}
,
Ŵ =
{
W (Y |X) :
(
α 1− α
1− β β
)
, α, β ∈ [0, 1]
}
.
Definition 5 (Best Channel to the Eavesdropper). Let Znθ be the output of the channel Vθ(Z
n|Xn). If there exists a θ∗ ∈
P(Sn|Xn) such that for all other θ ∈ P(Sn|Xn) the Markov chain
Xn → Znθ∗ → Z
n
θ , ∀n ∈ N (9)
holds, then we say that there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper and all channels Vθ(Z
n|Xn) are degraded with respect
to the channel Vθ∗(Z
n|Xn).
Definition 6 (Strongly Degraded). An Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channel with Channel input non-causally known at the
Jammer (AVWC-CJ) (or correspondingly an AVC,or an AVWC) is strongly degraded (with independent states, see [8]) if the
following Markov chain holds
X ↔ Yθ ↔ Zθ′ , ∀θ, θ
′.
Lemma 1 ([15, Corollary 2]). Let (xn, sn) ∈ T nPXS , with fixed but arbitrary T
n
PXS
, and X ′n be uniformly distributed on T nP .
Then
E
[
W
(( ⋃
sˆn∈Sn
T nW,δ(X
′n, sˆn)
) ∣∣∣∣xn, sn
)]
≤ exp
{
−n
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )− ν − ξ − ϑ
)}
(10)
Proof. See Appendix D.
III. CAPACITY FORMULAS FOR THE AVWCWITH NON-CAUSAL SIDE INFORMATION AT THE JAMMER
Theorem 1. Let an AVWC (W ,V) be given. If (W ,V) is strongly degraded and if there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper
and if the jammer has non-causal side information of the channel input xn ∈ Xn (and the corresponding messages), then the
common randomness assisted code secrecy capacity is given by
ĈranS (W ,V) = max
PX
(
min
θ∈P(S|X )
I(X ;Yθ)− max
θ∈P(S|X )
I(X ;Zθ)
)
(11)
= max
PX
(
min
θ∈P(S|X )
I(X ;Yθ)− I(X ;Zθ∗)
)
(12)
= max
PX
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )−max
V ∈
̂̂
V
I(P ;V )
)
(13)
This secrecy capacity depends on the row convex closures Ŵ and
̂̂
V .
Proof. In the following, we will only give a proof sketch, due to space limitation. For the complete proof see Appendix E and
Appendix F.
5a) Codebook Generation: Let χ := {Xnu,j,l : j ∈ Jn, l ∈ Ln, u ∈ Un}. Here j ∈ Jn = {1, 2, . . . , Jn} and l ∈ Ln =
{1, 2, . . . , Ln} correspond to the secure and confusing messages, respectively. We start by generating a deterministic wiretap
code for each u ∈ Un. Since we use random coding arguments, each codebook at this point is a random variable. Partition the
set of typical sequences T np,δ into disjoint subsets C(j,l) of size |C(j,l)| =
|T np,δ|
|Jn||Ln|
. For each codebook Knu(χ), we draw Jn ·Ln
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) codewordsXnu,j,l uniformly from the subsets C(j,l). We have Jn ·Ln = exp {nR}.
b) Decoding regions: Let D′ujl(χ) be given as
D′ujl(χ) =
⋃
sn∈Sn
T nWθ ,δ(X
n
ujl, s
n).
Then, we can define the decoding sets Dujl(χ), being random sets, as follows.
Dujl(χ) = D
′
ujl(χ)
⋂
 ⋃
(jl)′∈J×L
(jl) 6=(jl)′
D′u(jl)′ (χ)

c
(14)
c) Adaptation of the error criterion: We will modify the error criterion and require that both the secret message J and
the confusing message L should be successfully decoded at Bob. Hence, we have
eˆ(Krann ) ≤ max
j∈Jn
max
l∈Ln
max
xn∈Xn
max
sn∈Sn∑
u∈Un
pU|X,J,L(u|x
n, j, l)Wn(Dcujl|x
n, sn)
:= ˆˆe(Krann )
The proof can be summarized as follows.
d) Properties for Reliability: We use random coding arguments as in [6] opposed to the approach in [5], and generate
random sets of deterministic wiretap codebooks. Note that we have to take into account that the jammer possesses non-causal
knowledge about the channel input (and we allow knowledge of the messages, as we will see in [long version]), which results in
a different error probability than the usual one. Furthermore, we have to make sure, that each codeword belongs to sufficiently
many codebooks. If the jammer is able to allocate a codeword to only one codebook, we have the situation of deterministic
codes. Then we would have to consider the maximum error probability for that scenario, which is still an open problem. To
avoid this situation, the uncertainty for the jammer, even though he knows the channel input xn, has to be sufficiently high.
This can be achieved if the codewords belong to sufficiently many codebooks. We show that the probability of decoding a
wrong message vanishes asymptotically, as well. Therefore, we define the set of typical sequences at the legitimate receiver
as decoding regions, and can upper bound the error probability by using properties of typical sequences. Note that here in
contrast to the classical Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC), we have three error terms. The two traditional ones, there is
no typical sequence or there is a wrong typical sequence, and the probability that a given codeword exceeds for a specific
codebook a certain error bound. Since we apply random codes, we do actually not know which codebook realizations lead to
a good error performance. Otherwise, we could use specific codes and end up in the deterministic wiretap code case, which
is still an open problem. In the latter scenario, where the jammer knows the channel input non-causally, we would have to
consider the maximum error probability for deterministic codes. But we know that the error probability vanishes averaged over
a set of codebooks. Since the codewords occur in multiple codebooks, we have to take care of the situation that the codewords
perform well in some codebooks, but not so well in others. Therefore, we define the following sets.
U(j, l, xn, χ) :=
{
u : Xnu,j,l = x
n, xn ∈ Knu(χ)
}
U0(j, l, x
n, sn, χ) :=
{
u : Xnu,j,l = x
n, xn ∈ Knu(χ),
and Wn(Dcujl(χ)|x
n, sn) > λ
}
For the error probability we can overall conclude
ˆˆe(Krann ) = max
j∈Jn
max
l∈Ln
max
xn∈Xn
max
sn∈Sn ∑
u∈Uc0(j,l,x
n,sn)
pU|X,J,L(u|x
n, j, l)Wn(Dcujl|x
n, sn)
+
∑
u∈U0(j,l,xn,sn)
pU|X,J,L(u|x
n, j, l)Wn(Dcujl|x
n, sn)

≤ λ+ max
j∈Jn
max
l∈Ln
max
xn∈Xn
max
sn∈Sn
|U0(j, l, x
n, sn)|
|U(j, l, xn)|
6e) Properties for Security: We have to show that the leakage to the eavesdropper vanishes asymptotically. Therefore, we
make use of the fact that there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper and the fact that the probability that the implied
probability distributions are not in an ǫ region around the expected typical ones can be upper bounded using Chernoff bounds.
Then we can make use of [14, Lemma 2.7]. If the variation distance of the channel output probability distribution and the
conditional channel output probability distribution can be upper bounded, then the leakage can be upper bounded as well. To
upper bound the variation distance, the triangle inequality will be used in combination with properties of typical sequences.
Note that the existence of a best channel to the eavesdropper is crucial at this point to reduce the jammer’s possible choices
of jamming sequence from double exponentially many to only exponentially many. For details for the probabilities that the
aforementioned properties hold, see Appendix E.
f) Existence of Codes Fulfilling both Requirements: Last, we show that the probability of obtaining codes for which both
the decoding error probability and the leakage vanish asymptotically approaches one.
g) Converse: For the converse, we modify the standard converse proof for the WTC.
IV. EXAMPLE
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Fig. 2: Difference of capacities if the channel input is known or unknown at the jammer.
For a given x ∈ X , let I(x) denote the convex hull of the set {W (·|x, s) : s ∈ S} of probability distributions on Y , i.e.,
I(x) = conv (W (·|x, s) : s ∈ S), [4]. We consider the following example. Let the channel matrices be given as follows.
w(·|·, s1) =
0.1 0.90.7 0.3
0.8 0.2
 , w(·|·, s2) =
 0.2 0.80.85 0.15
0.9 0.1

v(·|·, s1) =
0.25 0.750.4 0.6
0.6 0.4
 , v(·|·, s2) =
 0.3 0.70.45 0.55
0.65 0.35

It is easy to see that this channel AVWC fulfills the strongly degraded property, and is not symmetrizable. The secrecy capacity
under the average error criterion for this AVWC without side information at the jammer, [13, Theorem 6, Corollary 1] is given
by
CranS,av(W ,V) = max
PX
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )−max
V ∈V̂
I(P ;V )
)
,
in contrast to the formula in equation (12). It is easy to see that
W¯ = αw(·|·, s1) + (1− α)w(·|·, s2)
=
 0.2− 0.1α 0.8 + 0.1α0.85− 0.15α 0.15 + 0.15α
0.9− 0.1α 0.1 + 0.1α
 ,
V¯ = βv(·|·, s1) + (1 − β)
=
 0.3− 0.05β 0.7 + 0.05β0.45− 0.05β 0.55 + 0.05β
0.65− 0.05β 0.35 + 0.05β
 .
7The secrecy capacity of this AVWC can be calculated to CranS,av(W ,V) ≈ 0.3 bits per channel use, pX(0) = pX(2) = 0.5,
pX(1) = 0, α = 0.5, β ≈ 1. In contrast to that, one can easily see that the channels
W¯ =
0.2 0.80.8 0.2
0.8 0.2
 V¯ =
0.25 0.750.4 0.6
0.65 0.35

correspond to the worst and the best channels to Bob and Eve, respectively, if the channel input is non-causally known at
the jammer. In this case, the secrecy capacity for the AVWC can be calculated to ĈranS (W ,V) ≈ 0.26 bits per channel use,
pX(0) = pX(1) = 0.5, pX(2) = 0. The second input symbol is used for the case with non-causal side information at the
jammer instead of the third one as for the AVWC without side information.
V. DISCUSSION
In this work, we derived a single letter formula for the random code secrecy capacity under the maximum error criterion for
an active attacker with non-causal side information of the codewords, provided there exists a best channel to the eavesdropper,
and that the channel is strongly degraded with respect to the main channel. The maximum error criterion was considered,
which implies that the messages might also be known at the jammer. We applied and extended methods of [6] and [13]. We
have shown that the derived secrecy capacity depends on the row convex closures of the sets of channels to Bob and Eve.
It is also clear that the secrecy capacity subject to the average error criterion for the case that the attacker does not possess
non-causal side information is lower bounded by the one, where the attacker has non-causal side information, subject to the
maximum error criterion..
A general multi letter formula for the case that the channel to the eavesdropper is not strongly degraded with respect to the
main channel, will be the subject of our future work.
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APPENDIX A
DETERMINISTIC WIRETAP-CODE
Definition 7 (Deterministic Wiretap-Code). An (n, Jn) deterministic wiretap-codeKn consists of a stochastic encoder E : J →
P(Xn) and mutually disjoint decoding sets Dj : Y
n → J , with message set J := {1, ..., Jn}. We denote EW
n
sn : J → P(Y
n)
by
EWnsn(y
n|j) =
∑
xn∈Xn
E(xn|j)Wn(yn|xn, sn).
The maximum error e(Kn) for the AVWC can be expressed as
e(Kn) := max
sn∈Sn
max
j∈Jn
∑
xn∈Xn
E(xn|j)Wn(Dcj |x
n, sn)
8If the jammer has non-causal knowledge about the channel input xn, then the maximum error probability has to be expressed
as
eˆ(Kn) := max
j∈Jn
∑
xn∈Xn
E(xn|j) max
sn=f(xn)
f∈F
Wn(Dcj |x
n, sn),
for an arbitrary family of functions F : Xn → Sn.
APPENDIX B
VARIATION DISTANCE AND PROPERTIES OF TYPICAL SETS
Definition 8 (Variation Distance). The variation distance of two distributions P1, P2 on X is defined as
||P1 − P2||V =
∑
x∈X
|P1(x)− P2(x)| (15)
Lemma 2 ([14, Lemma 2.7]). If ||P1 − P2||V = τ ≤
1
2 , then
|H(P1)−H(P2)| ≤ −τ log
τ
|X |
.
In the achievability part of the proof for Theorem 1, we will make use of the following lemmas and corollary , for which a
similar version for classical quantum channels can be found in [15, Lemma 1, Corollary 2]. Next, we summarize some known
facts from [14].
Lemma 3 (Properties of typical sets I). Let xn ∈ T np,δ. Then for any W : X → P(Y)
|T npW,2|X |δ| ≤ exp{n(H(pW ) + f1(δ))},
Wn(yn|xn) ≤ exp{−n(H(W |p)− f2(δ))} ∀y
n ∈ T nW,δ(x
n),
for some functions f1(δ), f2(δ) > 0 with limδ→0 f1(δ) = 0 and limδ→0 f2(δ) = 0.
Lemma 4 (Properties of typical sets II). Now, let δ > 0. Then for every p ∈ P(X ), W : X → P(Y) and xn ∈ Xn
pn(T np,δ) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)
|X | exp{−ncδ2},
Wn(T nW,δ(x
n)|xn) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)|X ||Y| exp{−ncδ2}
with c = 12 ln 2 . Furthermore, there exist an no, depending on |X |, |Y| and δ, such that for all n > n0 for each p ∈ P(X ) and
W : X → P(Y)
pn(T np,δ) ≥ 1− exp{−nc
′δ2}, (16)
Wn(T nW,δ(x
n)|xn) ≥ 1− exp{−nc′δ2} (17)
Lemma 5 (Properties of typical sets III). The cardinality of the set of all possible types of length n is upper bounded.
|Pn0 (S)| ≤ (n+ 1)
|S|.
Lemma 6 (Properties of typical sets IV). Assume, the distributions p, p ∈ P(X ) and the two matrices W,W : X → P(Y)
are given. For any positive integer n and sufficiently small δ > 0,
(pW )n(T n
W,δ
(xn)) ≤ (n+ 1)|X ||Y|
exp{−n(I(p;W )− f3(δ))},
for all xn ∈ T np,δ holds, with some f3(δ) > 0 and limδ→0 f3(δ) = 0. Furthermore, there exist an n0 and a ν, depending on
|X |, |Y| and δ, such that for all n > n0, ν > 0
(pW )n(T n
W,δ
(xn)) ≤ exp{−n(I(p;W )− ν))}. (18)
9APPENDIX C
PROOF OF REMARK 3
We consider both, the error probability and the information leakage. Let for the maximization over sn given xn the maximum
error probability and the information leakage respectively be given as
e(Kn) := max
j∈J
∑
xn∈Xn
E(xn|j) max
sn=f(xn)
f∈F
Wnsn(D
c
j |x
n),
lim
n→∞
max
sn=f(xn)
f∈F
max
u∈Un
I(pJn ;EuV
n
sn) = 0
Using the same (n, Jn) deterministic wiretap code fulfilling the above criteria now considering the maximization over θ
n ∈
P(Sn|Xn) we can express the maximum error probability of transmitting one codeword as∑
xn∈Xn
E(xn|j)Wnθn(D
c
j |x
n) =
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
sn∈Sn
E(xn|j)θn(sn|xn)Wn(Dcj |x
n, sn),
and hence we have
max
j∈J
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
sn∈Sn
E(xn|j)θn(sn|xn)Wn(Dcj |x
n, sn) ≤ max
j∈J
∑
xn∈Xn
E(xn|j) max
sn=f(xn)
f∈F
Wn(Dcj |x
n, sn)
≤ max
j∈J
∑
xn∈Xn
max
θn∈P(Sn|Xn)
E(xn|j)Wnθn(D
c
j |x
n)
= e(Kn)
For the leakage we can show that
max
sn=f(xn)
f∈F
I(pJn ;EuV
n
sn) = max
θn∈P(Sn|Xn)
I(pJn ;EuV
n
θn), since
EuV
n
sn =
∑
xn∈Xn
Eu(x
n|j)V (zn|xn, sn),
V nθn =
∑
xn∈Xn
θn(s|xn)V (zn|xn, sn),
EuV
n
θn =
∑
xn∈Xn
Eu(x
n|j)
∑
sn∈Sn
θn(sn|xn)V (zn|xn, sn).
The mutual information is convex in V (zn|xn, sn) for fixed input distribution. Hence, taking linear combinations of V (zn|xn, sn)
does not increase the leakage term. Furthermore, each value of I(pJn ;EuV
n
sn) can also be achieved by I(pJn ;EuV
n
θn), since
the deterministic mappings F are a subset of the stochastic mappings P(Sn|Xn), F ⊂ P(Sn|Xn) and hence the equality is
established.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF OF LEMMA 1
Proof of Lemma 1. Since the proof is given for the quantum case in [15], we adopt it to the classical case.
Let (Xn, Sn) be uniformly distributed on T nPXS and let X
′n be uniformly distributed on T nP . We have
E
[
W
(( ⋃
sˆn∈Sn
T nW,δ(X
′n, sˆn)
) ∣∣∣∣Xn, Sn
)]
(a)
=
∑
x′n∈T n
P
pXn(x
′n)
∑
(xn,sn)∈T nPXS
1
|T nPXS |
W
(( ⋃
sˆn∈Sn
T nW,δ(x
′n, sˆn)
) ∣∣∣∣xn, sn
)
(b)
≤
∑
x′n∈T n
P,δ
pXn(x
′n) exp {nξ}
∑
(xn,sn)∈Xn×Sn
pnXS(x
n, sn)W
(( ⋃
sˆn∈Sn
T nW,δ(x
′n, sˆn)
) ∣∣∣∣xn, sn
)
(c)
=
∑
x′n∈T n
P
pXn(x
′n) exp {nξ}
∑
yn∈(
⋃
sˆn∈Sn T
n
W,δ
(x′n,sˆn))
∑
(xn,sn)∈Xn×Sn
pnXS(x
n, sn)W (yn|xn, sn)
(d)
=
∑
x′n∈T n
P
pXn(x
′n) exp {nξ}
∑
yn∈(
⋃
sˆn∈Sn T
n
W,δ
(x′n,sˆn))
∑
(xn,sn)∈Xn×Sn
n∏
i=1
pXS(xi, si)W (yi|xi, si)
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(e)
=
∑
x′n∈T nP
pXn(x
′n) exp {nξ}
∑
yn∈(
⋃
sˆn∈Sn T
n
W,δ
(x′n,sˆn))
n∏
i=1
∑
(x,s)∈X×S
pXS(x, s)W (yi|x, s)
(f)
=
∑
x′n∈T nP
pXn(x
′n) exp {nξ}
∑
yn∈(
⋃
sˆn∈Sn T
n
W,δ
(x′n,sˆn))
n∏
i=1
∑
x∈X
∑
s∈S
pX(x)pS|X(s|x)W (yi|x, s)
(g)
=
∑
x′n∈T nP
pXn(x
′n) exp {nξ}
∑
yn∈(
⋃
sˆn∈Sn T
n
W,δ
(x′n,sˆn))
n∏
i=1
∑
x∈X
pX(x)Ŵ (yi|x)
(h)
=
∑
x′n∈T n
P
pXn(x
′n) exp {nξ}
∑
xn∈Xn
pnX(x
n)Ŵ
n
(( ⋃
sˆn∈Sn
T nW,δ(x
′n, sˆn)
) ∣∣∣∣xn
)
=
∑
x′n∈T n
P
pXn(x
′n) exp {nξ}
∑
xn∈Xn
pnX(x
n)Ŵ
n

 ⋃
Ps|x∈P0(S|X )
⋃
sˆn∈TP
s|x′
T nW,δ(x
′n, sˆn)
∣∣∣∣xn

≤
∑
x′n∈T nP
pXn(x
′n) exp {nξ}
∑
Ps|x′∈P0(S|X )
∑
xn∈Xn
pnX(x
n)Ŵ
n

 ⋃
sˆn∈TP
s|x′
T nW,δ(x
′n, sˆn)
∣∣∣∣xn

≤
∑
x′n∈T n
P
pXn(x
′n) exp {nξ}
∑
Ps|x′∈P0(S|X )
∑
xn∈Xn
pnX(x
n)Ŵ
n

 ⋃
sˆn∈TP
s|x′
T nW,δ(x
′n, sˆn)
∣∣∣∣xn

≤
∑
x′n∈T n
P
pXn(x
′n) exp {nξ}
∑
Ps|x′∈P0(S|X )
∑
xn∈Xn
pnX(x
n)Ŵ
n((
T nˆˆ
W,δ
(x′n)
) ∣∣∣∣xn)
(i)
≤
∑
x′n∈T n
P
pXn(x
′n) exp {nξ}(n+ 1)|X ||Y||S| exp
{
−n
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )− f3(δ)
)}
(j)
≤ exp
{
−n
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )− ν − ξ − ϑ
)}
Here, (a) follows by evaluating the expectation. (b) follows because 1|T n
PXS
| ≤ exp{nξ}p
n
XS(x
n, sn). (c) follows by expressing
W
((⋃
sˆn∈Sn T
n
W,δ(x
′n, sˆn)
) ∣∣∣∣xn, sn) as ∑yn∈(⋃sˆn∈Sn T nW,δ(x′n,sˆn))W (yn|xn, sn). (d) follows because of the memoryless-
ness. (e) follows by rearranging the sum and the product. (f) follows by expressing pXS(x, s) by pX(x)pS|X(s|x). (g) follows
by identifying
∑
s∈S pS|X(s|x)W (yi|x, s) as Ŵ (yi|x). (h) follows by reexpressing the product as the n-letter extension. (i)
follows because of lemma 6 and the fact that T nW,δ(x
′, sn) ⊂ T n
Ŵ
(x′n) for a Ŵ ∈ Ŵ . Finally, (j) follows by upper bounding
(n+ 1)|X ||Y||S| by exp{nϑ}. Next we have
W
(( ⋃
sˆn∈Sn
T nW,δ(x
′n, sˆn)
) ∣∣∣∣xn, sn
)
= W
(( ⋃
sˆn∈Sn
T nW,δ(π(x
′n), sˆn)
)∣∣∣∣π(xn, sn)
)
,
where π is an arbitrary permutation. This is true, since the probability only depends on the joint type of (x′n, xn, sn).
pX ′SX (x
′n, xn, sn) = pX ′(x
′n)pSX (x
n, sn).
Therefore, ∑
x′n∈T nP
pXn(x
′n)W
(( ⋃
sˆn∈Sn
T nW,δ(x
′n, sˆn)
) ∣∣∣∣xn, sn
)
is constant and we can rewrite the expectation to
E
[
W
(( ⋃
sˆn∈Sn
T nW,δ(X
′n, sˆn)
) ∣∣∣∣Xn, Sn
)]
=
∑
(xn,sn)∈T n
PXS
pXnSn(x
n, sn)
∑
x′n∈T nP
pXn(x
′n)W
(( ⋃
sˆn∈Sn
T nW,δ(x
′n, sˆn)
) ∣∣∣∣xn, sn
)
11
= E
[
W
(( ⋃
sˆn∈Sn
T nW,δ(X
′n, sˆn)
) ∣∣∣∣xn, sn
)]
,
for all (xn, sn) ∈ T nPXS , with fixed but arbitrary T
n
PXS
.
APPENDIX E
ACHIEVABILITY
a) Codebook properties for reliability: As already mentioned, we have to make sure, that every codeword occurs in
multiple codebooks. By generating the codebooks Knu(χ), u ∈ Un as above, there are
|T np,δ|
Jn · Ln
= exp {n(H(X)−R+ ǫ1(n))}
nonoverlapping codebooks in the worst case, where R corresponds to the code rate. To ensure the occurrence of each codeword
in k codebooks (on average), we should use an amount of common randomness which corresponds to
|Un| ≥ k exp {n(H(X)−R+ ǫ1(n))}.
We follow and combine the ideas of [9], [16] and [15].
First, let us fix a pair (j, l) ∈ Jn×Ln, a sequence x
n ∈ C(j,l) and the state sequence s
n ∈ Sn. We have to show that if the
sequence xn is a codeword (occurring in multiple codebooks), then the state sequence is bad only for few codebooks, such
that averaged over all codebooks, the error probability still vanishes. This has to hold for all pairs (j, l), sequences xn ∈ C(j,l)
and sn ∈ Sn.
Therefore, we define the following sets.
U(j, l, xn, χ) :=
{
u : Xnu,j,l = x
n, xn ∈ Knu(χ)
}
(19)
U0(j, l, x
n, sn, χ) :=
{
u : Xnu,j,l = x
n, xn ∈ Knu(χ), and W
n(Dcujl(χ)|x
n, sn) > λ
}
(20)
We can define the random variable R as
R(u, j, l, xn, χ) =
{
1 if Xnu,j,l = x
n, xn ∈ Knu(χ)
0 else.
(21)
It is easy to see that Pr{R(u, j, l, xn, χ) = 1} = 1|C(j,l)| =
Jn·Ln
|T n
p,δ
| = exp {−n(H(X)−R+ ǫ1(n))}. By the Chernoff bound
we obtain
Pr {|U(j, l, xn, χ)| ≤ (1 − ǫ2)|Un|Pr{R(u, j, l, x
n, χ) = 1}} = Pr
{∑
u∈Un
R(u, j, l, xn, χ) ≤ (1− ǫ2)|Un|
Jn · Ln
|T np,δ|
}
≤ expe
{
−
3ǫ22|Un|Jn · Ln
8|T np,δ|
}
Next, we will upper bound the probability that |U0(j, l, x
n, sn, χ)| is greater than a certain value. Therefore, we define the
event E1(j, l, x
n, sn, u, λ, χ) as there exists a xn ∈ C(j,l) with X
n
u,j,l = x
n and
Wn(Dcujl(χ)|x
n, sn) > λ.
Furthermore we define the random variable R˜(E1(j, l, x
n, sn, u, λ, χ)) as
R˜(E1(j, l, x
n, sn, u, λ, χ)) =
{
1 if Xnu,j,l = x
n, xn ∈ Knu(χ) and W
n(Dcujl(χ)|x
n, sn) > λ
0 else.
(22)
Then again by the Chernoff bound we obtain
Pr
{
|U0(j, l, x
n, sn, χ)| ≥ (1 + ǫ2)|Un| · Pr
{
R˜(E1(j, l, x
n, sn, u, λ, χ)) = 1
}}
= Pr
{∑
u∈Un
R˜(E1(j, l, x
n, sn, u, λ, χ)) ≥ (1 + ǫ2)|Un| · Pr
{
R˜(E1(j, l, x
n, sn, u, λ, χ)) = 1
}}
≤ Pr
{∑
u∈Un
R˜(E1(j, l, x
n, sn, u, λ, χ))
≥ (1 + ǫ2)|Un| · Pr{R(u, j, l, x
n, χ) = 1}Pr
{
Wn(Dcujl(χ)|x
n, sn) > λ|R(u, j, l, xn, χ) = 1
}}
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We consider the case that the error bound is not met for a fixed u ∈ Un. By the Markov inequality Lemma 10 and by Lemma
1 we have
Pr
{
Wn(Dcujl(χ)|x
n, sn) > λ|R(u, j, l, xn, χ) = 1
}
≤
E
[
Wn(Dcujl(χ)|x
n, sn)|R(u, j, l, xn, χ) = 1
]
λ
≤
E
[(
Wn
(
D′cujl(χ)|x
n, sn
)
+Wn
(⋃
(j,l)′∈Jn×Ln
(j,l)′ 6=(j,l)
D′u(jl)′ (χ)|x
n, sn
)) ∣∣∣R(u, j, l, xn, χ) = 1]
λ
≤
exp{−nc′δ′}
λ
+
∑
(j,l)′∈Jn×Ln
(j,l)′ 6=(j,l)
E
[(
Wn
(
D′u(jl)′ (χ)|x
n, sn
))
|R(u, j, l, xn, χ) = 1
]
λ
≤
exp{−nc′δ′}
λ
+
∑
(j,l)′∈Jn×Ln
(j,l)′ 6=(j,l)
E
[
W
((⋃
sˆn∈Sn T
n
W,δ(X
′n, sˆn)
) ∣∣∣∣xn, sn) ∣∣∣R(u, j, l, xn, χ) = 1]
λ
≤
exp{−nc′δ′}
λ
+
∑
(j,l)′∈Jn×Ln
(j,l)′ 6=(j,l)
exp
{
−n
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )− ν − ξ − ϑ
)}
λ
≤
exp{−nc′δ′}
λ
+
exp
{
−n
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )−R− ν − ξ − ϑ
)}
λ
Hence, we have
Pr
{∑
u∈Un
R˜(E1(j, l, x
n, sn, u, λ, χ))
≥ (1 + ǫ2)|Un| · Pr{R(u, j, l, x
n, χ) = 1}Pr
{
Wn(Dcujl(χ)|x
n, sn) > λ|R(u, j, l, xn, χ) = 1
}}
≤ expe
−
ǫ22|Un| exp {−n(H(X)−R + ǫ1(n)}
(
exp{−nc′δ′}
λ +
exp
{
−n
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )−R−ν−ξ−ϑ
)}
λ
)
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
Hence for all |Un| fulfilling
|Un| > exp {n(H(X)−R+ ǫ1(n)}
exp{−nc′δ′}
λ
+
exp
{
−n
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )−R− ν − ξ − ϑ
)}
λ
−1
the probabilities that codewords do not occur in an at least 1− ǫ2 times the expected number of codebooks and that codewords
occur in more than 1 + ǫ2 times the expected number of codebooks for which the error bound is not met, vanish super
exponentially fast.
The probabilities that the above events hold for all pairs (j, l) ∈ Jn × Ln, x
n ∈ C(j,l) and s
n ∈ Sn can be expressed by
Pr
 ⋂
(j,l)∈Jn×Ln
⋂
xn∈C(j,l)
⋂
sn∈Sn
{
|U0(j, l, x
n, sn, χ)| ≤ (1 + ǫ2)|Un| · Pr
{
R˜(E1(x
n, sn, u, λ, χ)) = 1
}}
= 1− Pr

 ⋂
(j,l)∈Jn×Ln
⋂
xn∈C(j,l)
⋂
sn∈Sn
{
|U0(x
n, sn, χ)| ≤ (1 + ǫ2)|Un| · Pr
{
R˜(E1(x
n, sn, u, λ, χ)) = 1
}}c
≥ 1− |Jn||Ln|
|T np,δ|
|Jn||Ln|
|Sn| expe
{
−
ǫ22|Un| exp {−n(H(X)−R+ ǫ1(n)}
8exp{−nc′δ′}
λ
+
exp
{
−n
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )−R− ν − ξ − ϑ
)}
λ

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= 1− |T np,δ||S
n| expe
−
ǫ22|Un| exp {−n(H(X)−R+ ǫ1(n)}
(
exp{−nc′δ′}
λ +
exp
{
−n
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )−R−ν−ξ−ϑ
)}
λ
)
8

and
Pr
 ⋂
(j,l)∈Jn×Ln
⋂
xn∈C(j,l)
⋂
sn∈Sn
{
|U(j, l, xn, χ)| ≥ (1− ǫ2)|Un|
Jn · Ln
|T np,δ|
}
= 1− Pr

 ⋂
(j,l)∈Jn×Ln
⋂
xn∈C(j,l)
⋂
sn∈Sn
{
|U(j, l, xn, χ)| ≥ (1− ǫ2)|Un|
Jn · Ln
|T np,δ|
}c
≥ 1− |Jn||Ln|
|T np,δ|
|Jn||Ln|
|Sn| expe
{
−
3ǫ22|Un|Jn · Ln
8T np,δ
)
}
= 1− |T np,δ||S
n| expe
{
−
3ǫ22|Un|Jn · Ln
8T np,δ
}
.
b) Codebook realization: Now, let Krann be a codebook realization fulfilling the aforementioned properties, with decoding
sets D′ujl as
D′ujl =
⋃
sn∈Sn
T nWθ,δ(x
n
ujl , s
n).
and decoding sets Dujl, being as follows.
Dujl = D
′
ujl
⋂
 ⋃
(jl)′∈J×L
(jl) 6=(jl)′
D′u(jl)′

c
(23)
c) Adaptation of the error criterion: We will modify the error criterion and require that both the secret message J and
the confusing message L should be successfully decoded at Bob. Hence, we have
eˆ(Krann ) = max
j∈Jn
max
f∈F
∑
u∈Un
pU (u)
∑
xn∈Xn
Eu(x
n|j)Wn(Dcj,u|x
n, f(xn))
= max
j∈Jn
max
f∈F
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
u∈Un
pU (u)E(x
n|j, u)Wn(Dcj,u|x
n, f(xn))
= max
j∈Jn
max
f∈F
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
u∈Un
p
(j)
UX(u, x
n)Wn(Dcj,u|x
n, f(xn))
= max
j∈Jn
max
f∈F
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
u∈Un
p
(j)
U|X(u|x
n)p
(j)
X (x
n)Wn(Dcj,u|x
n, f(xn))
≤ max
j∈Jn
max
f∈F
max
xn∈Xn
∑
u∈Un
p
(j)
U|X(u|x
n)Wn(Dcj,u|x
n, f(xn))
≤ max
j∈Jn
max
l∈Ln
max
f∈F
max
xn∈Xn
∑
u∈Un
pU|X,J,L(u|x
n, j, l)Wn(Dcujl|x
n, f(xn))
≤ max
j∈Jn
max
l∈Ln
max
xn∈Xn
max
sn∈Sn
∑
u∈Un
pU|X,J,L(u|x
n, j, l)Wn(Dcujl|x
n, sn)
:= ˆˆe(Krann )
Our motivation to do so is to reduce the size of the space, over which should be optimized. The family F = {f : Xn → Sn}
consists of |F| = |Sn||X
n| elements, hence grows doubly exponentially with n. By considering the maximum with respect to
xn, it is sufficient to consider the state sequence sn maximizing the error probability. Hence, we can reduce the space size
over which should be optimized to Xn × Sn, which grows only exponentially in n.
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d) Error Analysis: For the error probability we can overall conclude
ˆˆe(Krann ) = max
j∈Jn
max
l∈Ln
max
xn∈Xn
max
sn∈Sn
∑
u∈U(xn)
pU|X,J,L(u|x
n, j, l)Wn(Dcujl|x
n, sn)
= max
j∈Jn
max
l∈Ln
max
xn∈Xn
max
sn∈Sn
 ∑
u∈Uc0 (j,l,x
n,sn)
pU|X,J,L(u|x
n, j, l)Wn(Dcujl|x
n, sn)
+
∑
u∈U0(j,l,xn,sn)
pU|X,J,L(u|x
n, j, l)Wn(Dcujl|x
n, sn)

≤ λ+ max
j∈Jn
max
l∈Ln
max
xn∈Xn
max
sn∈Sn
∑
u∈U0(j,l,xn,sn)
pU|X,J,L(u|x
n, j, l)Wn(Dcxn,u|x
n, sn)
≤ λ+ max
j∈Jn
max
l∈Ln
max
xn∈Xn
max
sn∈Sn
∑
u∈U0(j,l,xn,sn)
pU|X(u|x
n)
≤ λ+ max
xn∈Xn
max
sn∈Sn
|U0(j, l, x
n, sn)|
|U(j, l, xn)|
≤ λ+
1+ ǫ2
1− ǫ2
exp{−nc′δ′}
λ
+
exp
{
−n
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )−R− ν − ξ − ϑ
)}
λ

The last inequality holds with probability going super exponentially fast to 1. We choose
λ = exp{−n
τ
2
},
τ < min
{
c′δ′, min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )−R− ν − ξ − ϑ
}
and have shown an exponential vanishing error probability.
e) Codebook properties for secure communication: As mentioned in the outline of the proof, we will try to use connections
between the mutual information and the variation distance. Notice that in contrast to the error analysis we do not average
over the codebook ensemble when considering the leakage. In other words, the leakage has to vanish for all u ∈ Un. It is
sufficient to consider the best channel to the eavesdropper since fulfilling the secrecy requirement for the best channel to the
eavesdropper implies that the secrecy requirement is fulfilled for all other channels to the eavesdropper, as well. Now, for a
fixed u ∈ Un, we have
I(pJn ;EuV
n
θ∗) = H(pJnEuV
n
θ∗)−H(EuV
n
θ∗ |pJn) (= H(Z
n
θ∗)−H(Z
n
θ∗ |J))
=
1
Jn
∑
j∈J
(H(pJnEuV
n
θ∗)−H(EuV
n
θ∗ |j))
=
1
Jn
∑
j∈J
H
 1
Jn
∑
j∈J
∑
xn
Eu(x
n|j)Vθ∗(·|x
n)
−H (∑
xn
Eu(x
n|j)Vθ∗(·|x
n)
)
=
1
Jn
∑
j∈J
(
H
(
V¯θ∗(·)
)
−H
(
Vˆθ∗(·|j)
))
Now, if we can show that
||V¯θ∗(·)− Vˆθ∗(·|j)||V ≤ ǫ3 ≤
1
2
then we can make use of [14, Lemma 2.7] and obtain
|H(V¯θ∗(Z
n))−H(Vˆθ∗(Z
n|j))| ≤ −ǫ3 log
ǫ3
|Z|n
We follow [13] to prove that the secrecy requirement is fulfilled. We have
||V¯θ∗(·)− Vˆθ∗(·|j)||V ≤ ||Vˆθ∗(·|j)− Ω(·)||V + ||Ω(·)− V¯θ∗(·)||V . (24)
Ω(Zn) will be defined in this section. We will concentrate on the first term, since
||Ω(·)− V¯θ∗(·)||V = ||
1
Jn
∑
j∈J
(
Vˆθ∗(·|j)− Ω(·)
)
||V
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≤
1
Jn
∑
j∈J
||Vˆθ∗(·|j)− Ω(·)||V .
Let (xn, sn) have type p0(x
n, sn) ∈ Pn0 (XS), with p0(x
n, sn) = pn(x)θ∗,n(s|x). We define the set
ε1(x
n) :=
{
zn ∈ TZθ∗ ,2|X |δ : V
n
θ∗(z
n|xn) ≤ exp{−n(H(Zθ∗|X))− f2(δ)}
}
, (25)
where f2(δ) is the one in Lemma 3. This is the set of typical z
n ∈ TZθ∗ ,2|X |δ fulfilling the second property (for z
n ∈ TVθ∗ ,δ(x
n))
in Lemma 3. Remember that if xn ∈ T np,δ and z
n ∈ TVθ∗ ,δ(x
n), then zn ∈ TZθ∗ ,2|X |δ.
We set
Ω˜(zn) = EX [V
n
θ∗(z
n|X)1ε1(X)(z
n)], (26)
where we take the expectation over all xn ∈ T np,δ, and define the set
ε2 :=
{
zn ∈ TZθ∗ ,2|X |δ : Ω˜(z
n) ≥ ǫn|TZθ∗ ,2|X |δ|
−1
}
, (27)
Remember that
|TZθ∗ ,2|X |δ| ≤ exp{n(H(Zθ∗) + f1(δ))},
ǫn = exp{−nc
′δ2}.
where we have |TZθ∗ ,2|X |δ| and ǫn by Lemmas 3 and 4, respectively.
Remark 4. The reason we set the lower bound in (27) will be clear when proving Lemma 7. Essentially, this term allows us
to upper bound the probability that the event in (31) is not true, when using a Chernoff-bound.
We set
Ω(zn) = Ω˜(zn)1ε2(z
n). (28)
By definition, Ω(zn) ≥ ǫn exp{−n(H(Zθ∗) + f1(δ))}, for all z
n ∈ ε2, else Ω(z
n) = 0. Note, that when summing up over all
zn ∈ ε2 we get ∑
zn∈ε2
Ω(zn) = Ω(ε2)
≥
∑
xn∈T n
p,δ
V nθ∗(TVθ∗ ,δ(x
n)|xn)pn(xn)
≥ 1− 2ǫn + ǫ
2
n
≥ 1− 2ǫn.
As in [13] we obtain a modification of V nθ∗ as
Qθ∗(x
n, zn) := V nθ∗(z
n|xn)1ε1(xn)(z
n)1ε2(z
n), (29)
and can define the event
ι1(j, z
n) :=
{
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qθ∗(Xjl, z
n) ∈ [(1± ǫn)Ω(z
n)]
}
(30)
Lemma 7. For τa > 0, the probability that ι1(j, z
n) is not fulfilled can be upper bounded as
Pr{ι1(j, z
n)c} ≤ 2 expe{−
1
3
exp{nτa}} (31)
Proof. We will make use of a Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, Lemma 8.
Pr
{
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qθ∗(Xjl, z
n) /∈ [(1± ǫn)Ω(z
n)]
}
≤ 2 expe
(
−Ln
ǫ2nΩ(z
n)
3
)
.
We can plug in the bounds for Qθ∗(Xjl, z
n) according to ǫ1(x
n), and Ω(zn) according to ǫ2,
Qθ∗(Xjl, z
n) ≤ exp{−n(H(Zθ∗ |X)− f2(δ))},
Ω(zn) ≥ ǫn exp{−n(H(Zθ∗) + f1(δ))},
and obtain for the exponent
−Ln
ǫ2nΩ(z
n)
3
≤ −
1
3
Lnǫ
3
n exp{−n(H(Zθ∗) + f1(δ))} exp{n(H(Zθ∗ |X)− f2(δ))}
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= −
1
3
Ln exp{−n(H(Zθ∗)−H(Zθ∗ |X) + f1(δ) + f2(δ)) + 3c
′δ2}
= −
1
3
Ln exp{−n(I(Zθ∗ ;X) + f1(δ) + f2(δ)) + 3c
′δ2}.
If we choose Ln to be
Ln ≥ exp{n(I(Zθ∗ ;X) + f1(δ) + f2(δ) + 3c
′δ2 + τa)},
lim
δ→0
f1(δ) = lim
δ→0
f2(δ) = lim
δ→0
3c′δ2 = 0,
then the probability that ι1(j, z
n) is not fulfilled vanishes doubly exponentially fast.
We define the event ι0 as the event that ι1(j, z
n) holds for all j ∈ Jn, z
n ∈ Zn, and u ∈ Un
ι0 :=
⋂
j∈Jn
⋂
zn∈Zn
⋂
u∈Un
ι1(j, z
n). (32)
We can bound the probability of ι0 from below as
Pr{ι0} = 1− Pr{ι
c
0}
= 1− Pr
 ⋃
j∈Jn
⋃
zn∈Zn
⋃
u∈Un
ιc1(j, z
n)

≥ 1− 2Jn|Z|
n|Un| expe{−
1
3
exp{nτa}}.
Since Jn, |Z|
n, and |Un| grow only exponentially fast in n, but Pr {ι
c
1(j, z
n)} vanishes doubly exponentially fast in n, the
probability that ι0 holds, approaches one.
f) Leakage analysis: Let Krann be a realization of the random random code fulfilling the required properties for guaranteeing
secrecy. We can now bound the first term in equation (24) for any j ∈ J as
||Vˆθ∗(Z
n|j)− Ω(Zn)||V ≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qθ∗(xjl, Z
n)− Ω(Zn)
∥∥∥∥∥
V
(33)
+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nθ∗(Z
n|xjl)1ε1(xjl)(Z
n)(1Zn(Z
n)− 1ε2(Z
n))
∥∥∥∥∥
V
(34)
+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nθ∗(Z
n|xjl)(1Zn(Z
n)− 1ε1(xjl)(Z
n))
∥∥∥∥∥
V
(35)
In the following, we bound the right hand side of (33), and the terms in (34), (35), individually.
The right hand side of (33) can be bounded by the result of Lemma 7 to∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qθ∗(xjl, z
n)− Ω(zn)
∥∥∥∥∥
V
=
∑
zn∈Zn
∣∣∣∣∣ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qθ∗(xjl, z
n)− Ω(zn)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
zn∈Zn
ǫnΩ(z
n)
≤ ǫn
For (34), we obtain∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nθ∗(Z
n|xjl)1ε1(xjl)(Z
n)(1Zn(Z
n)− 1ε2(Z
n))
∥∥∥∥∥
V
=
∑
zn∈Zn
∣∣∣∣∣ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nθ∗(z
n|xjl)1ε1(xjl)(z
n)(1Zn(z
n)− 1ε2(z
n))
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
∑
zn∈Zn
V nθ∗(z
n|xjl)1ε1(xjl)(z
n)1Zn(z
n)−
∑
zn∈Zn
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nθ∗(z
n|xjl)1ε1(xjl)(z
n)1ε2(z
n)
≤ 1−
∑
zn∈Zn
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qθ∗(x
n
j,l, z
n)
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≤ 1−
∑
zn∈Zn
(1 − ǫn)Ω(z
n)
≤ 1− (1− ǫn)(1− 2ǫn)
≤ 3ǫn − 2ǫ
2
n
≤ 3ǫn.
For (35), we obtain∥∥∥∥∥ 1Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nθ∗(Z
n|xjl)(1Zn(Z
n)− 1ε1(xjl)(Z
n))
∥∥∥∥∥
V
(a)
=
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nθ∗(ε
c
1(xjl)|xjl)
(b)
=
1
Ln
∑
l∈Ln
 ∑
zn∈TZθ∗ ,2|X|δ :
V nθ∗ (z
n|xjl)>exp{−n(H(Zθ∗ |X)−f2(·))}
V nθ∗(z
n|xjl) +
∑
zn /∈TZθ∗ ,2|X|δ
V nθ∗(z
n|xjl)

(c)
≤
1
Ln
∑
l∈Ln
∑
zn∈TZθ∗ ,2|X|δ :
V nθ∗ (z
n|xjl)>exp{−n(H(Zθ∗ |X)−f2(·))}
V nθ∗(z
n|xjl) + ǫn
(d)
≤
1
Ln
∑
l∈Ln
∑
zn∈Zn:
zn /∈TVθ∗,δ (xjl)
V nθ∗(z
n|xjl) + ǫn
(e)
=
1
Ln
∑
l∈Ln
∑
zn /∈TVθ∗,δ(xjl)
V nθ∗(z
n|xjl) + ǫn
(f)
=
1
Ln
∑
l∈Ln
V nθ∗(T
c
Vθ∗,δ
(xjl)|xjl) + ǫn
(g)
≤
1
Ln
∑
l∈Ln
exp{−nc′δ2}+ ǫn
(h)
= exp{−nc′δ2}+ ǫn.
Here, (a) follows by summing up only over zn ∈ ǫc1(·). (b) follows by expanding (a) in the sense of ǫ
c
1(·). (c) follows, since
the probability of not obtaining a typical zn can be upper bounded by ǫn. (d) follows by summing over a larger set. (e) and
(f) follow by rewriting (d). (g) follows since the probability of not obtaining a conditional typical zn can be upper bounded.
(h) follows since the upper bound in (g) is valid for all xjl.
Therefore, in total we obtain
||V¯θ∗(Z
n)− Vˆθ∗(Z
n|j)||V ≤ 10ǫn + 2 exp{−nc
′δ2}
I(pJn ;EuV
n
θ∗) ≤ n
(
10ǫn + 2 exp{−nc
′δ2}
)
log (|Z|)
−
(
10ǫn + 2 exp{−nc
′δ2}
)
log
(
10ǫn + 2 exp{−nc
′δ2}
)
,
which vanishes as n goes to infinity.
g) Existence of codes fulfilling both the error and the secrecy requirement: After having proved that there exist codes ful-
filling the error requirement and the secrecy requirement separately, we show that there exist codes fulfilling the aforementioned
criteria simultaneously.
Therefore, we define the following event.
ι˜ :=
ˆˆe(Krann (χ)) ≤ λ+
exp{−nc′δ′}
λ
+
exp
{
−n
(
min
W∈Ŵ
I(P ;W )−R− ν − ξ − ϑ
)}
λ

ιˆ := ι0 ∩ ι˜
Here, we can apply the union bound and obtain
Pr{ιˆ} = 1− Pr{ιˆc}
= 1− Pr{ιc0 ∪ ι˜
c}
≥ 1− Pr{ιc0} − Pr{ι˜
c},
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where both, Pr{ιc0} and Pr{ι˜
c} vanish super exponentially fast. Hence, there exist codes fulfilling the aforementioned criteria
simultaneously. Therefore, the following common randomness assisted secrecy rate is achievable
R̂ranS ≤ max
PX
(
min
θ∈P(S|X )
I(X ;Yθ)− max
θ∈P(S|X )
I(X ;Zθ)
)
.
APPENDIX F
CONVERSE
For the converse, we introduce a time sharing parameter and use the fact that we can here express the difference of two
mutual information terms as one single conditional mutual information term.
nR̂s = H(J)
(a)
≤ min
θ∈P(Sn|Xn)
I(J ;Y nθ |U) + 1 + ǫˆH(J),
→ nR̂s ≤
1
1− ǫˆ
(
min
θ∈P(Sn|Xn)
I(J ;Y nθ |U)− I(J ;Z
n
θ∗ |U) + max
u∈U
I(J ;EuV
n
θ∗) + 1
)
(b)
≤
1
1− ǫˆ
(
min
θ∈P(Sn|Xn)
I(J ;Y nθ |U)− I(J ;Z
n
θ∗ |U) + nRL + 1
)
(c)
≤
1
1− ǫˆ
(
min
θ∈P(Sn|Xn)
I(J ;Y nθ |U)− I(J ;Z
n
θ∗ |U) + nǫ+ 1
)
(d)
=
1
1− ǫˆ
(
min
θ∈P(Sn|Xn)
I(J ;Y nθ |Z
n
θ∗ , U) + nǫ+ 1
)
(e)
≤
1
1− ǫˆ
(
min
θ∈P(Sn|Xn)
I(J,Xn;Y nθ |Z
n
θ∗ , U) + nǫ+ 1
)
(f)
=
1
1− ǫˆ
(
min
θ∈P(Sn|Xn)
(I(Xn;Y nθ |Z
n
θ∗ , U) + I(J ;Y
n
θ |X
n, Znθ∗ , U)) + nǫ+ 1
)
(g)
=
1
1− ǫˆ
(
min
θ∈P(Sn|Xn)
I(Xn;Y nθ |Z
n
θ∗ , U) + nǫ+ 1
)
(h)
≤
1
1− ǫˆ
(
max
u∈U
min
θ∈P(Sn|Xn)
I(Xn;Y nθ |Z
n
θ∗ , U = u) + nǫ+ 1
)
(i)
=
1
1− ǫˆ
(
min
θ∈P(Sn|Xn)
I(Xn;Y nθ |Z
n
θ∗) + nǫ+ 1
)
(j)
=
1
1− ǫˆ
(
min
θ∈P(Sn|Xn)
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yθ,i|Zθ∗,i) + nǫ+ 1
)
=
1
1− ǫˆ
(
n∑
i=1
min
θ∈P(S|X )
I(Xi;Yθ,i|Zθ∗,i) + nǫ+ 1
)
(k)
=
1
1− ǫˆ
(
n
(
min
θ∈P(S|X )
I(X ;Yθ|Zθ∗)
)
+ nǫ+ 1
)
(l)
=
1
1− ǫˆ
(
n
(
min
θ∈P(S|X )
I(X ;Yθ)− I(X ;Zθ∗)
)
+ nǫ+ 1
)
⇒ R̂S ≤
1
1− ǫˆ
(
min
θ∈P(S|X )
I(X ;Yθ)− I(X ;Zθ∗) + ǫ+
1
n
)
Here, follows by Fano’s inequality, where ǫˆ approaches zero as n → ∞, (b) follows by the definition of the leakage to the
eavesdropper, (c) follows because the leakage to the eavesdropper vanishes with n. (d) follows because of the strongly degraded
property of the channel, (e) follows by applying the chain rule and the fact that the mutual information is not negative. (f)
agian is by the chain rule, (g) by the Markov chain J ↔ (Xn, Znθ∗, U) ↔ Y
n
θ , (h) and (i) follow because of the Markov
chain (U, J) ↔ Xn ↔ Y nθ ↔ Z
n
θ∗ , (j) and k by the memorylessness of the channel, and (l) again by the strongly degraded
property.
APPENDIX G
INEQUALITIES
The Chernoff-Hoeffding bound is widely used in the proof. Therefore, it shall be stated here.
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Lemma 8 (Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds). Let X1, X2, ..., Xn be i.i.d. Random Variables (RVs) with values in [0, b], where b
is a positive number. Further, let E[Xi] = µ, and 0 < ǫ <
1
2 . Then
Pr
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi 6∈ [(1± ǫ)µ]
}
≤ 2 expe
(
−n
ǫ2µ
3b
)
, (36)
where [(1± ǫ)µ] means the interval [(1 − ǫ)µ, (1 + ǫ)µ].
There exist also other versions of the Chernoff bounds.
Lemma 9 (Chernoff bounds). Let X1, X2, ..., Xn be i.i.d. RVs with values in {0, 1}, with Pr{Xi = 1} = p. For all α ∈ (0, 1)
and p0 < p < p1, the following bounds hold
Pr
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi > (1 + ǫ)p1
}
< expe
{
−
ǫ2
8
np1
}
, (37)
Pr
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
Xi < (1− ǫ)p0
}
< expe
{
−
3ǫ2
8
np0
}
. (38)
Furthermore, we give a reminder on Markov’s inequality.
Lemma 10 (Markov’s Inequality). Let X be a RV with mean E[X ] = µ and let a be a positive number. Then
Pr{X ≥ a} ≤
µ
a
.
